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Executive Summary
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats because of their potential to inflict harm upon humans, crops, livestock, health infrastructure, and economies. The following questions stimulated the research described in this report: What infrastructure is necessary to enable EID surveillance in developing countries? What are the cultural, political, and economic challenges that are faced? Are there generalizations that may be made to inform engagement with developing countries and support EID surveillance infrastructure?
Using the U.S. Naval Area Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2) as a common denominator, this report compares barriers to EID surveillance in Cambodia and in Indonesia and presents key factors-uncovered through extensive interviews-that constrain disease surveillance systems.
In Cambodia, the key factors that emerged were low salaries, poor staff and human resources management and the effect of patronage networks, a culture of donor dependence, contrasting priorities between the government and international donors, and the lack of compensation for animal culling. Cambodian authorities have resisted a compensation scheme thus far, with speculation suggesting that the reason for this is the government's concern that the possibility for corruption among poultry-holders is too great a risk. The Cambodian military has also played a part. The government ceased a merit-based salary supplement scheme for civil servants (including laboratory employees funded by the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria) after the military is alleged to have demanded similar pay incentives which donors had no interest in funding.
In Indonesia, the key issues emerging as barriers to effective surveillance include poor hostdonor relationships, including differing host-donor priorities and a misunderstanding of NAMRU-2 by Indonesian Authorities; low salaries; a decline in the qualifications of personnel in the Ministry of Health; poor compensation for culling; and difficulties incentivizing local-level reporting in an era of decentralization. Conflict between external and host actors was given the greatest emphasis, with "viral sovereignty" the primary problem. The Indonesian government perceived unfair treatment when it was asked to pay millions of dollars for a vaccine developed from a sample it originally provided for diagnostic purposes to the U.S. government through NAMRU-2.
A poor host-donor relationship is a major barrier in Indonesia, which exhibits greater political and financial autonomy than Cambodia and other less-developed countries.
ii | P a g e Ultimately these differences are symptomatic of Cambodia's and Indonesia's different levels of development and their roles within the international community. This context demonstrates the primary difference in existing barriers to surveillance between the countries. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that other developing countries face similar barriers along a continuum from one extreme (Cambodia, where a genocide resulted in the death of a quarter of the population) to another (Indonesia, where state-of-the-art-labs can be run by Indonesians educated in countries such as France and Australia with some donor funds).
Scientists are fully capable of fixing technical problems in surveillance systems, but nontechnical barriers have been more difficult to confront. Not surprisingly, the primary challenges impeding surveillance are observed on the human resources side of the equation.
When it comes to viral sovereignty, technology transfer has been proposed as a possible solution to enable resource-constrained countries to produce their own vaccines. Yet this is easier said than done; international development has tried for more than six decades to raise living standards with limited success. What is certain is that Indonesia's human resources are already capable of producing some vaccines given sufficient technology, while Cambodia will require a decade or more to develop such a capability. It is clear that in Cambodia, technology transfer is necessary but not sufficient.
Many of the key factors emerging from interviews with in-country practitioners are the direct result of the existing level of development and, as such, are perhaps beyond the scope of health and scientific agencies at this point. Nevertheless, greater understanding is a critical first step in mitigating negative outcomes.
Introduction

Motivation
1
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats because of their potential to inflict harm upon humans, crops, livestock, health infrastructure, and economies.
Influenza virus A/H1N1's impact on the Mexican economy in 2009, for example, has been estimated at almost one percent of that country's Gross Domestic Product.
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The current state of human disease surveillance is reactive; that is, researchers detect microbes after an outbreak has already occurred. Furthermore, countries vary greatly in their EID surveillance capabilities. Effective EID surveillance is particularly problematic in developing countries. In order to envision such surveillance on a global scale, a set of fundamental questions must be answered. What infrastructure is necessary to enable EID surveillance in developing countries? What are the cultural, political, and economic challenges that would be faced? Are there generalizations that may be made to inform engagement with developing countries and support EID surveillance infrastructure?
By using Cambodia and Indonesia as case studies, and analyzing the role of the U.S. Naval
Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) in these countries, this report finds that the primary constraints to disease surveillance systems in these nation-states stem from the challenges they face in the following areas: lack of financial resources, absence of a professional civil service, prevalence of grand and petty corruption, and the existence of unsustainable or ineffective patronage networks.
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The key to promoting sustainability is in building national ownership and capacity, and transferring technology that enables local actors to take charge of their own EID surveillance systems. According to a director of Laboratory Systems Development at a major American university with experience in * Sophal Ear, an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, teaches courses on post-conflict reconstruction and the political economy of Asia. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy or U.S. government. I thank my Research Assistants: Zachariah James Falconer-Stout (who single-handedly plowed through 200 pages of notes and content and analyzed it with tags), Jim Chhor, Serei Linda Tauch, Khamly Chuop, John La, and last but not least Ita Perwira and Syefri Luwis (who were my eyes, ears, scribes, and sometimes spokespersons in Jakarta). The help and guidance of Meg Flanagan, Paul Forster, Amalya Mangiri, Gina Samaan, Sandra Yolles, Hugo Yon, and Jim McLaughlin, but most of all 49 contacts in Cambodia and Indonesia who cannot be named here for confidentiality reasons, is gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveats apply; all remaining errors are my own.
overseas laboratory capacity building, creating labs and disease reporting systems for only select agents is problematic. A broader approach is needed, one that would strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, address local priorities, and ultimately make possible better surveillance for the agents of public health concern. However, this director also noted that it is often difficult to convince funders of the importance of addressing broader public health systems issues.
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The case studies of Cambodia and Indonesia demonstrate that both the technical and human aspects of disease surveillance systems must be addressed. As such, awareness of local political, economic, and cultural issues is critical if policy-makers are to build more effective disease surveillance systems.
Background and Context
NAMRU-2 in Indonesia
In Asia, NAMRU-2 is dedicated to maintaining the "operational readiness of deployed forces in the region against infectious diseases with mission abortive potential," and it represents a tremendous U.S. asset for EID surveillance. The NAMRU-2 website describes its work in emerging diseases research as follows: By contrast, as shown in Table 2 , in Indonesia the OIE PD changes almost as regularly as in Cambodia, but the title remains the same: Director General, Livestock Services, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The author was informed during interviews in Indonesia that the country had not declared any H5N1 outbreaks to the OIE in recent years, despite the fact (or perhaps because) the disease is already endemic in poultry. and to obtain laboratory diagnoses. States are also required to inform the WHO and travellers of measures they intend to enact and to submit weekly reports on the development of outbreaks. In practice, however, many states have not reported outbreaks, and when the WHO has announced such occurrences, it is often some time after the fact. This rather weak system, hardly the fault of the WHO secretariat or its committees, reflected the lack of concern about the transmission of diseases among industrial countries and an unwillingness to suffer the consequences of reporting among many developing countries. Indonesia and Cambodia bear sufficient similarity to provide adequate grounds for comparison when addressing cultural considerations. At the same time, a significantly different set of challenges to EID surveillance-driven primarily by the lack of resources in Cambodia and greater independence in Indonesia-allow for variation on the dependent variable (namely, surveillance effectiveness), while providing important opportunities to glean new insights on barriers to effective EID surveillance.
Literature Review
The question of the necessary, or ideal, infrastructure needed for effective disease surveillance has been discussed extensively in the context of developing countries. A Government Accountability
Office report published in 2001 notes:
Surveillance systems in all countries suffer from a number of common constraints. However, these constraints have their greatest impact in the poorest countries, where per capita expenditure on all aspects of health care amounts to only about 3 percent of expenditure in high-income countries. Surveillance in developing countries is often impaired by shortages of human and material resources. Key positions in laboratories and clinics often are filled by people who do not possess the necessary qualifications. According to [the World Health Organization], staff in over 90 percent of developing country laboratories are not familiar with quality assurance principles, and more than 60 percent of laboratory equipment is outdated or not functioning… In addition, poor roads and communications make it difficult for health care workers to alert higher authorities about outbreaks or quickly transport specimens to laboratories … In addition, multiple surveillance systems are often poorly coordinated and not firmly linked to response measures. The absence of a clear response discourages lower level officials from investing effort in surveillance, and this leads to many cases of disease going unrecorded and unreported. These weaknesses limit the effectiveness of even the most widely supported international disease control programs. They also impair routine surveillance for other diseases and efforts to investigate and respond to outbreaks, newly emerging diseases, and growth in antimicrobial resistance. 25 Aside from an explicit critique of the technical ("equipment is outdated or not functioning") and human resource constraints ("shortages of human … resources"), this 74-page report hints at both economic ("shortages of … material resources") and political ("absence of a clear response") obstacles. However, the report never delves into an important political aspect-namely the lack of political will for surveillance due to competing incentives-nor does it touch upon cultural constraints that impair effective surveillance. 26 E-mail to author on Tuesday, August 31, 2010 11:28:40 AM. The director further added "The Division for which I was responsible … focused on quality assurance rather than on disease specific tests. Funding for any work related to strengthening laboratories generally comes from disease specific programs (e.g., HIV, Malaria, TB, etc.) so the laboratory work tends to focus on implementing tests with little consideration of the infrastructure that is required to assure quality practices. Disease specific programs didn't (and for the most part, still don't) see laboratory quality assurance and management as issues for expending their disease-specific resources. As you might imagine, this is a source of considerable frustration since the new direction for the Global Health Initiative is supposed to be focused on country ownership and sustainability. Without attention to issues of quality (including the ability of a country to procure quality test kits/reagents, access to proficiency testing, oversight of laboratories, etc.), sustainability will not be possible. With respect to diagnostic microbiology, the issues are even more complex. While many seem to think that technology will provide the answer through point-of-care assays, those are some distance off and despite supposed 'ease of use' those assays still require an understanding of appropriate quality assurance. In addition, many of the new molecular technologies are dependent on instrumentation that is expensive and dependent on a constant power supply which does not exist. Conventional microbiology also requires an understanding of quality assurance practices and the ability to procure quality materials. If donors are providing everything without paying attention to the shortcomings of the systems issues within the country, then the work will not be sustainable. Not a very direct response to your question and a bit long-winded, but those are the major issues I see that will hold back implementation of conventional or new technology. I am currently doing some work in Ethiopia, and there is virtually no diagnostic microbiology being performed in hospitals in Ethiopia. In India, where I have worked with World Bank and CDC Global AIDS Program, the situation is not much better. While some facilities perform microbiological procedures, there is no way to document quality of any of the work. As an example, I was in a district hospital where the laboratory director (a medical microbiologist) told me they had dehydrated blood agar. When I asked him about the source of blood, he said it was dehydrated. While I am sure someone in his lab knew that they needed to add sheep blood, this person who was supposed to be somewhat authoritative did not understand that there was no blood in the bottle of dehydrated medium he who examined the gap between H5N1 "awareness" and practice in
Cambodia. The gap is between poor poultry-keeping practices and high awareness of H5N1, because poultry holders cannot financially afford to follow recommended practices, especially in the presence of Newcastle disease (an endemic poultry disease like H5N1, but which is harmless to humans). This conflict can even take place in a family that had a member die from H5N1 as shown in Hickler's research; not even the loss of a loved one is enough to alter an entire family's habits. In
Restuadhi's determination, "it is thought that there is a gap between these three situations: the dissemination of information on the AI outbreaks, the weak follow up to the outbreaks and the 29 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/pr92/en/ Accessed 8 October 2011. 30 According to international development scholar Paul Forster (2009: 34), Participatory Disease Surveillance & Response "is based on a qualitative approach to epidemiology known as participatory epidemiology, which has the objective of developing and supporting a community-based response to detecting and preventing the disease by using local knowledge of where and when outbreaks are occurring, and enlisting the local population in control efforts. It has much in common with established techniques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) but has evolved significantly in Indonesia. The first phase of the PDSR project emphasized the detection and control of HPAI by separate surveillance and response teams primarily in 'backyard' settings at the household level. Now, a broader village-level approach encompasses all poultry farmers, traders and community leaders; a greater stress is put on empowering communities to understand the origin, prevention and control of all poultry diseases; and better links are sought with veterinary services, where capacity is being developed through PDSR. 
Methodology
Building on the insights of the existing literature above, a qualitative comparative case study focusing showing an affiliation with the Naval Postgraduate School-meant that for some officials, particularly in the Indonesian government, interviews could not be undertaken without prior authorization from a supervisor at the director level. In one case, an interview was aborted due to untimely authorization. In other instances, the author's Cambodian origin caused Indonesian informants to believe that the author was not American, causing them to feel as if they were speaking to someone from another-perhaps less-developed country. Having worked in international development for a number of years for the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme, the author was able to engender a rapport quickly with informants who might otherwise have perceived the author as an ivory tower academic.
By comparing two different country cases with one common actor-NAMRU-2-determinants of success and failure were identified for a wider range of developing country contexts. 36 Given that both Cambodia and Indonesia are in Asia, the addition of a case study on Egypt or Kenya in future research will strengthen the validity of findings.
Indonesia, issues of trust between the government and international organizations have resulted in tense relations, while Cambodian officials are more than happy to have NAMRU-2 there because the country is so dependent on external help. Indeed, unless NAMRU-2 were to begin to undermine the political regime by destabilizing it or offending it, there is no foreseeable end to NAMRU-2's presence in Cambodia in the coming decades.
Hypotheses Devised in January-February 2009
Originally hypothesized challenges (Table 3) 
) Economic
Lack of financial and technical resources set an already low bar for public health system. Existing heavy donor involvement unlikely to be sustainable.
Lack of financial and technical resources (though likely to a much lesser extent than Cambodia where half the government's budget is donor financed-while Indonesia is hardly dependent on foreign aid). (2) Political
Lack of political will in public health infrastructure and recurrent costs support; plenty of willingness to spend in Defense sector.
Resources politicized, patronage rampant; and privatization of public hospitals is on the horizon (implications for surveillance remain to be seen).
Viral sovereignty
Cambodia
Indonesia (3) Cultural
Technical knowledge may come from neighboring countries that have had historical tensions with Cambodians. 
Results
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This section first presents the key issues that emerged from the nearly 50 interviewees and considers these issues in light of the hypothesized political, economic, and cultural challenges from Table 3 to effective surveillance. It proceeds with an analysis of these challenges by interpreting similarities and differences in the context of each country's level of development and dependence on foreign aid-a proxy for sovereignty since the less aid a country receives the less it relies on others. It concludes by arguing that while technical problems can be fixed with technical solutions (NAMRU-2 being a case in point), in the presence of political, economic, and cultural barriers, even the most advanced laboratory is no match. Consequently, while EID surveillance systems that are not nationally owned may possess short to medium-term viability (a decade, if that), these systems are not perpetually sustainable even with external funding, or may never reach a fully functional level in accordance with donor expectations. Although money may trump sovereignty in the short run, sovereignty trumps money in the long run.
Analysis of Interview Results and Response on Hypothesized Variables
Extensive interviews conducted by the author with public health officials across government, nongovernmental, and donor agencies in Cambodia and Indonesia (Table 4) reveal that the countries exhibit both similarities and differences in the perceived barriers to effective surveillance for EIDs. Note: * The number of interviews and unique interview subjects differs because while most interviews were one-on-one, some interviews were conducted with two or more persons, and yet others might have involved the same individual interviewed over the course of multiple visits. Source: Tabulation of author's interview notes.
For each country, interview subjects identified several economic, political, and cultural issues. Table 5 lists the most commonly identified factors that subjects emphasized as the top barriers in the order of their importance (based on frequency with which particular subjects were emphasized for a given country). Note: Content analysis was performed on interview notes and tagged for key themes; these tags were then analyzed for frequency. * By proportion of interview sessions † By proportion of interview sessions Difference in calculation due to prevalence of group interviews in Indonesia Source: Tag analysis of author's interview notes.
In both countries, interviewees noted problems of corruption, patronage, low salaries, inadequate or non-existent compensation schemes for animal culling, and the potential for conflict between international donors and host governments. Differences emerge, however, in the extent of many of these issues. In Cambodia, the lack of resources received greater attention as the primary barrier to effective surveillance, while in Indonesia, conflict between external and host actors was given greater emphasis. In both countries, interview subjects perceived animal disease surveillance to lag significantly behind human disease surveillance.
Cambodia-Specific Findings
For Cambodia, the key factors that emerged from interviews were low salaries, poor management of staff and human resources and the effect of patronage networks, a culture of donor dependency, contrasting priorities between the national government and international donors, and the lack of compensation for animal culling. Furthermore, the military's influence on the Cambodian government plays a significant role. Yet some hypothesized variables did not prove to be key factors at this point.
Low Salaries
The low level of salary compensation (circa $50 per month, far less than the cost of living in Phnom Penh) was the most often pinpointed culprit in a larger context of poor human resources, which concurs with the hypothesis that a lack of resources would be a key barrier. In particular, this issue draws attention to the fact that of the myriad resources necessary for effective surveillance, human resources are most lacking in Cambodia (and in developing countries in general).
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Subjects mentioning this issue as a barrier frequently made reference to the fact that technical capacity far exceeded human capacity, and that the latter's dearth was in fact preventing the efficient use of donor-funded equipment. As one international doctor bluntly stated, "In Cambodia, like anywhere in the world, if you pay people they do their job. If you don't pay them they won't. They've got to feed their kids."
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All informants who discussed low compensation of civil servants-including those working in government labs-proceeded to explain that donors' inability to tackle this problem was why donor-funded laboratory and/or EID surveillance equipment and supplies were under-utilized, unused, or even pilfered (as in the case of valuable reagents by the lab's director).
Poor Staff/Human Resources Management and the Effect of Patronage Networks
Poor management and the detrimental effects of patronage networks 
Donor Dependence
In Cambodia, there are specific problems associated with donor dependence, including a range of issues concerned with long-term planning. One is the lack of sustainability represented by the donor-driven model. In such a context, priorities can shift on a yearly basis, leading local workers to question the long-term commitment to a specific program. Such ambiguity is obviously detrimental to any program, as it diminishes the incentives of local staff to dive enthusiastically into a project when they might see funding cut before results can be shown.
Contrasting Priorities
Lack of ownership more generally is a serious problem in development work-how can external interventions be locally owned? Informants noted additional issues arising when the government avoids funds that come with too many strings attached, such as overly stringent auditing (Ministry of Health official) 41 and the lack of a government grand plan to coordinate the various donor-driven programs (Ministry of Health senior official).
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In the latter situation, the Cambodian government is perceived as being unable to turn down funds, even when the funds are not helpful (International doctor). it is difficult to ascertain how exactly this issue affects EID surveillance.
Indonesia-Specific Findings
In Indonesia, the key issues emerging as barriers to effective surveillance include poor host-donor relationships and differing host-donor priorities, as well as a misunderstanding of NAMRU-2 by Indonesian authorities; low salaries; a decline in the quality of personnel in the Ministry of Health;
poor compensation for culling; and difficulty incentivizing local levels to report back to the central government in an era of decentralization following democratization.
Poor Host-Donor Relationships
In contrast to Cambodia, the top two issues arising out of Indonesia both focused on the relationship between the host country-Indonesia-and its donors. The issue occurred again in the fifth-most emphasized factor: a disconnect or miscommunication between NAMRU-2 and Indonesian authorities regarding NAMRU-2's activities and contributions to disease surveillance. It should be noted that interviews were conducted during NAMRU-2 Jakarta's last days-staff were still coming to work, hoping closure could be averted-and thus subjects may to some extent have been responding to the news of that time. As often happens with departing diplomats and those about to leave their jobs, this made for extremely candid conversations. With NAMRU-2 Jakarta officially "closed" since April 2010, and its Commanding Officer now based in Hawaii, any hope of a resolution has withered.
Yet, independent of the NAMRU-2 affair, problems in host-donor relations are an understandable barrier in Indonesia, a country that exhibits significantly greater autonomy than
Cambodia and other developing countries in the international realm and vis-à-vis donors. Unlike in Cambodia, the Indonesian government is operating surveillance systems out of its own interests resulting from its sense of greater accountability to its citizens. Consequently, the government has been better at articulating its own needs-partly because it does enjoy greater human resources capacity than Cambodia, but primarily because of a greater ownership of its own affairs and a higher expectation that donors will meet these needs.
Low Salaries
The low salaries issue is similar to that in Cambodia, and indicative of a lack of adequate resources that is particularly acute on the human capacity side. It should be noted, however, that unlike
Cambodia there was no perception of "ghost labs"-labs that are equipped but are empty of local personnel because they moonlight elsewhere. Concurring with the preliminary hypotheses, the lack of resources was emphasized to a much lesser extent in Indonesia than in Cambodia.
Despite its greater resources, Indonesia still suffers from a lack of sustainability in its surveillance efforts and public health laboratory capacity. The fact that the Indonesian government contributes significantly more of its own money to public health activities than Cambodia-because it can afford to do so-does not preclude concerns of sustainability, a fact that some donors only later recognized when activities they funded were handed over to the Indonesian authorities. For example, Indonesian authorities took control of NAMRU-2's Early Warning Outbreak Response System (EWORS) but could not continue efforts due to a lack of financial resources. When
Indonesian authorities requested NAMRU-2 also hand over the millions of dollars needed to run EWORS, NAMRU-2 refused as these were U.S. government funds that could not simply be given to Indonesian authorities to spend. EWORS is reportedly not functioning.
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Decline in Ministry of Health Personnel Quality As discussed, viral sovereignty emerged as a key issue as a result of the Indonesian government's impression that it was being asked to pay millions of dollars for a vaccine that was developed using a sample that the government had originally provided for diagnostic purposes. Ultimately, as the interview material reveals, the root of the problem was not this incident itself-although it might have been the a catalyst-but a breakdown in communication between a specific donor (NAMRU-2) and the host government that had begun much earlier.
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Significant here was a perceived decline in qualified personnel at the Ministry of Health, though criticism focused on the specific personality of the former Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari, and was connected to the fallout over NAMRU-2. Concurrently, the composition of NAMRU-2's American staff changed from highly experienced, seasoned hands who had already established themselves as authorities to younger researchers who needed to "publish or perish,"
according to an interview with an international scientist.
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What had been a mutually beneficial relationship based on capacity-building turned into one of research execution for the purpose of publishing in order to burnish a young researcher's credentials. Unlike the younger scientists now populating NAMRU-2, the more established scientists decades earlier were not driven by such concerns.
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An epidemiologist in Thailand's Ministry of Health, who reported similar issues with American government lab in Thailand, supported this sentiment.
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The effect is that refereed research became paramount and capacity-building became an afterthought.
The cultural hypothesis involving Indonesia's desire to partner with a state such as Iran, also Ultimately, however, disease surveillance data need to be collected and centralized in order to discover potential outbreaks. The breakdown was identified as disincentives at the local level: while local health workers are responsible for reporting, they often fail to see reported cases addressed by the central government because there is no feedback loop. On the local level, the primary concern is diagnosing and treating illness; reporting does not necessarily aid in accomplishing this task.
Furthermore, when samples are sent to Jakarta, the long delays compound the perception that the central level is unhelpful in meeting district and provincial priorities. The divergence of priorities has both sides feeling that they have critical needs left unfulfilled by the disease surveillance regime, impeding its efficacy.
Overall Findings
It is critical to note that while this research is concerned with political, economic, and cultural barriers to disease surveillance (as opposed to technical or scientific barriers), the questions asked were open to all kinds of barriers. It was often the interview subjects themselves, therefore, who referred to "social science" variables. Their responses indicate that at present, the greatest barriers to effective surveillance systems may be shortcomings on the human side, although additional interviews of government officials and NGOs with in-country experience is needed to confirm this preliminary finding. emphasized the presence of state-of-the-art "ghost labs," where donor-funded infrastructure goes unused due to inadequate human resources.
The similar issues that interview subjects identified as impeding surveillance systems in Cambodia and Indonesia stem from these states' status as developing countries. It is not surprising that a lack of financial resources, the absence of a professional civil service, and the existence of patronage networks and corruption constitute challenges in this context. It is reasonable to hypothesize that other developing countries, then, face similar barriers along a continuum from one extreme (Cambodia, where a genocide resulted in the death of a quarter of the population, particularly intellectuals) to another (Indonesia, where expensive labs can be run by Indonesians educated in France and Australia, with some donor support). In both countries, the lack of local resources has necessitated heavy donor involvement in order to achieve the present surveillance systems.
As interviews revealed, however, donor involvement in each country has met a different response. While interview subjects noted the potential for friction in both countries, it was particularly pronounced in Indonesia, where it has been attributed as a key factor leading to the closure of NAMRU-2. Beyond the poor relationship between the host government and international actors (including non-American ones, such as the sometimes tenuous relationship of ex-colonies and their former colonizers), other challenges specific to Indonesia include a perceived decline in the qualifications of Ministry of Health personnel, and difficulty in incentivizing local reporting by responding in a timely manner at the central level. For Cambodia, there is a perception that the challenges posed by corruption, patronage, and the lack of human resources are more acute.
Additional issues also arise due to poor management and a culture associated with donor dependence.
Ultimately, these differences are symptomatic of Cambodia's and Indonesia's different levels of development and their roles within regional and international communities. Cambodia is significantly less developed and appears locked in a cycle of "donor dependence" in which a significant burden of governing tasks is assumed by international donors (NGOs, bilateral, and seldom fail to stress-making it the world's fourth-most populous country and reasonably placing it in the category of "regional power."
This context is central to understanding the interviews conducted: it demonstrates that donor dependence is the primary difference in barriers to surveillance between the countries. In Cambodia, donor dependence has resulted in an environment where the primary objective is to obtain funds from donors. As a result, the host government is generally compliant with donor priorities; the relationship between the host and donor is cordial, and the host will go to great lengths to please its benefactor, often acting like a supplicant. The downside of this environment, however, is lack of ownership and poor governance: endemic corruption and oppressive patronage networks impede meritocratic work environments, with an expected detrimental impact on surveillance. This overriding problem can explain why, despite significant technical investment, disease surveillance systems fall short of donors' standards: the human side of the equation remains underdeveloped.
Indonesia's greater independence and more competent governance, on the other hand, has the benefit of alleviating-though certainly not eliminating-the problems of corruption, patronage, and ineffective civil service. These same attributes, however, carry a certain trade-off for donors, as the host government is understandably more aware of its own local needs and is better able to articulate these needs. The accompanying expectation is that organizations hosted by the national government will assist in meeting these national priorities.
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In the context of a more developed governing capacity, the national host may be more susceptible to domestic political pressures arising from a foreign presence. In contrast to an aid-dependent nation, donors' money and presence is not an unambiguous good. As a result, in Indonesia, the overriding challenge facing donors is maintaining a good working relationship with the host government. A real or perceived divergence in the interests of the host and foreign donor organization risks the foreign organization "wearing out its welcome."
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In this environment, a foreign organization must give greater thought to effective public relations, not to mention political and cultural considerations, as the risks of being misunderstood can be catastrophic and have the potential to lead to derailments like that of NAMRU-2.
Of particular relevance to this study was the agreement in both Cambodia and Indonesia that animal disease surveillance systems lag behind human disease surveillance. The finding was also reflected in the respondents' views of the Ministries of Health versus the Ministries of Agriculture; the latter were ubiquitously viewed as less capable and less important. This factor fails to appear in Table 5 because, while commonly acknowledged, only a handful of respondents (two in Cambodia and three in Indonesia) emphasized this view as a primary barrier to effective disease surveillance.
There was also some indication that a rivalry between ministries contributed to poor animal surveillance (two respondents in Cambodia and one in Indonesia noted this factor). Additionally, two respondents in Indonesia indicated a more general need for better coordination between the multiple agencies and organizations involved in the effort.
A study by the World Health Organization's Angela Merianos (2007), of the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response, argued that on "a global level, the human health sector lags behind the animal health sector in the assessment of potential threats," because "little attention has been given to determining the direct and indirect costs of human disease outbreaks, including morbidity and excess mortality, health service delivery costs, public health expenditure, the psychosocial impact on affected individuals, families and communities, the economic impact on travel, tourism and the insurance industry, and loss of confidence in governments and health services."
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Merianos allowed that "substantive differences exist among countries in their national 57 Even during the 2004 tsunami that affected Aceh, Indonesia, and many other countries, there was great sensitivity to having American military personnel on the ground in the humanitarian mission that followed. Measures) . Absent such investigation, however, the most plausible explanation for discrepancies between animal and human disease surveillance may be that the life of a human is valued more than that of an animal, and in poor countries struggling to find the resources to deal with human beings, the monitoring of animals will suffer from chronic neglect. In the case of Indonesia, the one cultural factor that emerged was ethnic Chinese poultry producers versus the ethnically Javanese-dominated civil servants who regulate them. 
Conclusion
Scientists are fully capable of fixing technical problems in disease surveillance systems, but nontechnical barriers have been more difficult to confront. The primary challenges impeding surveillance are observed on the human resources side of the equation. Nevertheless, as experiences in both Cambodia and Indonesia demonstrate, the technical and human sides of disease surveillance systems are complementary inputs-and an awareness of economic, political, and cultural issues is critical if policy-makers are to strategically build more effective systems.
59 Merianos (2007) . 60 Early findings from the author's follow-on study of Mexico's experience with A/H1N1 confirmed Merianos' finding there-animal disease surveillance, driven by trade concerns with the U.S.-appears in better shape than human disease surveillance. 61 To provide some context, Indonesia enjoys industrial production of poultry, as opposed to the backyard production that takes place in Cambodia. The majority of Indonesian commercial poultry producers are said to be majority ethnic Chinese (Interview, Jakarta 4 January 2010). Precise numbers are not available, but it is known that while one percent of Indonesia is ethnic Chinese, the captains of industry come from this group, and they tend to be deeply distrusting of the Javanese-controlled government. Lack of consultation and lack of trust have meant that public-private cooperation suffers, and problems are not reported. Indeed, to avoid regulations and taxes, some "mom and pop" operations use wooden pens even if they hold one hundred thousand chickens. This enables them to be categorized as backyard operations.
Yet this is more easily said than done.
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International development-that is, the business of transferring both technology and human capacity-has tried for more than 60 years to achieve this result with limited success (Taiwan and South Korea enjoyed high levels of foreign aid and succeeded in developing). What is certain is that Indonesia's human resources are already capable of producing some vaccines given sufficient technology (PT Bio Farma, a state-owned company based in Bandung, produces influenza vaccine), 68 while Cambodia will require a decade or more to produce vaccines in-country-with the issue of viral sovereignty not yet on the horizon.
69
Many of the key factors emerging from interviews are symptomatic of current levels of development, and as such are perhaps beyond the scope of health agencies. Nevertheless, greater understanding is a critical first step in mitigating negative outcomes. Overall, it is obvious that scientists and international agencies wishing to build more effective disease surveillance systems must recognize the non-technical constraints that each country presents. Supari has yet to materialize. 68 For example, one advanced laboratory in Indonesia is in such dire need of money that its scientists (interviewed in Jakarta on 12 January 2010) work on a month-to-month basis. 69 A Ministry of Health official in Cambodia knew about viral sovereignty and even characterized the issue as one of benefit-sharing, but unless Cambodians become involved in testing (as happened in the case of AIDS anti-retrovirals for prophylaxis use, when the Cambodian Prime Minister stopped trials), viral sovereignty does not appear to be of immediate concern in Cambodia.
